Public services and goods can provide relevant inputs to private productive activities. Modern States organize the production of these inputs on the basis of taxes collected from the community. When this process is affected by bureaucrats' corruption the efficiency of public expenditure decreases. In this paper we deal with the long-run consequences of this form of corruption. A model of economic growth with public inputs to private production is put forward. The production of public goods needs inputs from the private sector that bureaucrats buy with some degree of discretion. The aim of an illegal agreement between the exchanging parties is to profit from the lack of information. Governments fight corruption through costly public purchases monitoring. The extent of corruption is a decision variable in the maximization of expected revenue. This model finds support in the econometric analysis of the Italian case. A dynamic panel data approach to economic growth based on data of 20 regions allows us to estimate the effect of corruption on the productivity of expenditure on public investment. This effect is significant and distinct from a direct negative one of corruption on the growth rate.
Introduction
In recent years a large number of papers on the causes and consequences of corruption have been published. Most of these papers are theoretical or qualitative analyses 1 . The first comprehensive econometric research to assess the impact of corruption on economic growth is contained in Mauro, (1995) . On the basis of cross-country data Paolo Mauro finds a significant negative relation between a corruption index, built using information assembled from the correspondents of Business International in 70 countries in the early 1980s, and the rate of growth. According to the findings of Mauro, policies to fight corruption could be very beneficial to growth:
"…A country that improves its standing on the corruption index, say, 6 to 8, (0 being the most corrupt, 10 the least) will experience a 4 percentage point increase in its investment
rate and a 0,5 percentage point increase in its annual GDP growth rate." (Mauro, 1998) .
There are different ways corruption could reduce economic growth. Corruption could act as a tax and could lower incentive to invest. Corruption could increase the ability of agents to get resources from central and local governments. Therefore, public resources reward the more "able" people, not the best entrepreneurs. Corruption could distort the composition of government expenditure as corrupt politicians may be expected to invest in large, non-productive projects from which it is easier than in productive activities to exact large bribes.
Most of the existing literature on the long-run economic consequences of corruption (Shleifer e Vishny, 1993; Ehrlich, 1999) focuses on rent seeking in the provision of public services. A government official controls the offer of a service against private demand. He has some discretionary power on the offer and can restrict it in several ways (e.g. denying permission or delaying its release). Bribes are the extra-price charged by bureaucrats to private customers, and arise like rents. The economic consequences of this phenomenon concern distortions in resources allocation mainly in terms of less private investment, and a reduced rate of human capital formation. In Ehrlich (1999) corruption is an economic activity that requires some political capital. Effort devoted to the accumulation of this kind of knowledge has an alternative use in human capital production. Corruption reduces economic growth through a negative influence on investments in human capital.
Our paper maintains that corruption has strong negative effects on economic growth also because it lowers the amount and quality of public infrastructure and services supplied to the private sector. Corruption arises when bureaucrats manage public resources to produce public goods and services. Asymmetric information between government and its agents is the basic assumption that we make in a model of economic growth. The State cannot fully ascertain what (its quality or efficiency) bureaucrats buy and the actual price they charge. Illegal behaviour results from providing the government with low quality goods at the same price as private markets, acquiring the same goods at a higher price, or both cases. Bureaucrats and private agents agree to profit from a lack of information, even if their behaviour is harmful for the community welfare.
This case of corruption appears relevant in undeveloped countries (Bardhan, 1997) where the organization of the State is especially inefficient, democratic control of the civil community over government actions is absent, and bureaucrats have wide discretionary power (Azariadis and Lahiri, 1997) .
In order to evaluate the effect of corruption on the efficiency of public expenditure, particularly investment in infrastructures, we perform an econometric analysis with reference to the Italian economy. One problem that arises in the interpretation of regression based on cross-country data is the following: countries differ greatly, not only in levels of corruption, but also in the extent of administrative controls on different aspects of economic life, the importance of government-subsidies and transfers, the incidence of government-operated enterprises etc.. It could be very difficult in regressions based on cross-country data to control for such differences. A study that is based on regional data within a country could more easily control for such differences.
We have used data on time series of 20 Italian regions to verify whether corruption -measured by the official number of crimes against the public administration-is one of the possible causes of the limited success of the policy addressed to the development of Southern Italy. Our results show that the efficiency of public expenditure is lower in regions where corruption is higher, and that corruption has a negative effect on economic growth of Italian regions 2 .
In the following section 2 a model of growth is put forward. Then, in section 3 the econometric model is described and results are discussed. Conclusions follow in section 4.
A model of growth and corruption in government purchases from the private sector.
Our theoretical framework rests on a model of growth where corruption arises from market relations between government and private agents. In a very simple setting, the government collects taxes from the community and provides it with public goods the production of which require inputs purchased from the private sector. 2 Putnam, (1993) studies the performance of Italian regional governments as political institutions. His analysis takes the point of view of political sciences and does not contain a quantitative assessment of the economic impact of the quality of regional institutions.
The economy is made up of a large number of equal agents that produce and consume a single good with two types of inputs: private capital and public goods. Each agent in turn spends some time (fixed) working as a community agent. He plays that part by collecting taxes and buying commodities from private producers for the production of public goods. This market is regulated by the government and subject to asymmetric information. The community can easily ascertain prices but will have some difficulty in ascertaining the effective amount of goods acquired by government agents. Bureaucrats and entrepreneurs can find an agreement and make a profit from corruption. Each agent in turn plays both parts in this illegal exchange, and we assumed they are all equal, so that a representative agent takes all the profit earned from corruption, and we can put aside any analysis of profit share.
Ex-post monitoring over government purchases makes revenues from corruption uncertain. Discovery and punishment occurs with probability P. Monitoring has a cost that causes a certain amount of resources to be wasted to fight corruption. Agents decide the extent of their involvement in this illegal activity maximizing expected revenues.
Economic growth with public spending is modelled as in Robert Barro (1990) . Percapita output y can be used as consumption c, as investment k . , and as a rival, excludable good provided by the government g. In fact, we assume a one to one technology for public goods production with respect to private inputs. Taxes ty provide the government with resources. When corruption affects public expenditure, the private sector can count only on a share (1-θ) of public goods production, while corrupt agents take the rest θ. Let us define g as the amount of public goods production without any corruption, then the following identity results:
In this economic environment production technology can be described as:
where A is the level of technology, and returns to scale are constant. In the following, a
Cobb-Douglas production function replaces eq. (2).
Our formalization of corruption as an economic activity follows the one of microeconomic models of crime such as Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) . Agents are assumed to be risk neutral and to choose θ, the quantity of public resources they steal, maximizing the illegal expected net income. Entrepreneurs are engaged in two different activities: goods production and corruption. We assume the two are fully separate. In fact, each agent has little significance with respect to the aggregate, and he chooses k assuming no effect of his decisions on the level of income and public expenditure (see Barro, 1990, p. S108). This hypothesis also means that variations in capital stock do not change the revenue from corruption.
The outcome of corruption is uncertain because of the repressive action of the State.
When successful (with probability 1-P), entrepreneurs profits are: θty; Ex-post monitoring of the transactions in the public sector occurs with frequency P, and a cost per unit value of public expenditure S(P) that increases with P
In cases of unsuccessful attempts at corruption, guilty agents take θty but are charged with a monetary penalty Mty, that can be thought of as a direct consequence of punishment (as a fine), or indirect as income losses deriving from both imprisonment and the monetary value of losses in social status. M(θ) is a positive increasing function of θ, that approximate crime seriousness, with:
.
The expected profit of corruption is:
A representative agent maximizes eq. (3) with respect to θ. The first order condition is:
From equation (4), the optimal value of effort θ * is an inverse function of the probability P:
Of course, according to eq. (3) it is always possible to set such a high fine that it discourages any illegal activity, or to check any transaction (P=1). But, in order to describe real economies we rule out these opportunities. Legal systems today, even in undeveloped countries, do not allow the setting of very high penalties for crimes against the administration. We assume that there are costs in collecting penalties from guilty agents.
They collaborate with the State, and pay the penalty if they feel that the amount is fair relative to the seriousness of the crime, hence collection costs are low. These costs increase if agents consider that the fine is disproportionate with respect to the crime and fight against such an unfair penalty. The government can choose for each value of θ the penalty M(θ) that maximizes the revenue from fines net of costs 3 .
Given M(θ), the government fights against corruption monitoring bureaucrats' purchases, and wasting an amount of resources PSty. It is reasonable to assume that monitoring is paid out of fines collected from guilty agents 4 :
In this case the frequency of monitoring P is such that
On the left side of eq. (7) there is a decreasing function of P, while the function on the right side is increasing. Nothing prevents us from assuming that the functions involved in eq. (7) are shaped so that an equilibrium value for P exists and is always lower than one (figure 1).
The negative effect of corruption stands clear in the budget constraint of the government:
From the viewpoint of private agents, corruption allows a reduction in the amount of taxes transferred to the government because of an expected net revenue θty -PMty. This illegal revenue has a negative counterpart in terms of public goods and services offered to the private sector.
3 The following example gives an increasing convex function M(θ). The government maximizes the objective function with respect to
is a cost function for collecting fines. From f. o. c., a function can be derived:
that gives the optimal penalty for each crime of corruption θ. 4 Other policies against corruption could be specified -e. g. maximizing the rate of growth, or intertemporal utility -but our qualitative results remain the same.
In this economy, the allocation of resources to consumption and capital accumulation is affected by corruption. Agents derive satisfaction from consumption according to a simple constant elasticity utility function:
Each entrepreneur derives income from his legal and illegal activities, and maximizes utility over infinite time subject to a balance constraint. This problem is formalized as 
The Hamiltonian function is:
where λ is a costate variable. Optimization provides us with the following first order conditions:
Combining eq. (12a) and eq. (12b), we get the growth rate of consumption:
Another expression for γ derives from considering that (1-θ)g=(1-θ)ty, and
In fact, substituting eq. (14) into the growth rate equation (13) we obtain:
This growth rate is common to the variables g and k .
, and the economy evolves along a balanced growth path without passing through any transitional dynamics.
Eq. (15) shows two opposite effects of corruption on the rate of growth. One effect is positive due to the reduction of taxes caused by illegal profits (θty-PMty). The second is negative as a consequence of fewer public services to productive activities. In appendix A we show that, if γ° is the growth rate when corruption is nil, then
where
The negative effect of corruption on the growth rate could prevail when productivity of g is high (α is high), and the tax rate t is low. These conditions seem to apply to undeveloped economies where infrastructure scarcity makes their productivity high, and a large irregular productive sector provides the government with poor resources.
Higher efficiency of public monitoring, (lower costs S(P)), may cause an increase in the probability P of corruption discovery, that reduces θ and has a positive impact on the growth rate. In the same way, an improvement in public purchase regulation could reduce the economic incentive for corruption. In fact, in this case too, corruption discovery becomes less expensive.
3. An econometric analysis of economic growth, public infrastructure and corruption in Italy, (1963-1991) .
The econometric model and data.
In this section we perform an econometric analysis of economic growth in Italy that Even though poor regions have grown substantially, today their distance from the rich is still wide. We maintain corruption is one of the main reason for the smaller amount of infrastructures available to the private sector in several Italian regions, notwithstanding the huge program of public expenditure that has been carried out during the last forty years.
The empirical literature on productivity and rate of return on public infrastructure has produced a variety of estimates and approaches to the question. In several studies, data concern both particular items within the category of infrastructure, and aggregate public investment. Some models 5 refer to the tradition of factor productivity estimation, performed either on the basis of production functions parameters (Aschauer, 1989) , or applying the theory of duality between technology and costs (Morrison and Schwartz, 1996) . A different econometric framework has been specified in studies of cross-countries economic growth. These focus on the determinants of the rate of growth, among which some proxies for public infrastructures and public expenditure have been included. The endogenous growth theory provides theoretical support to that relation, but there are still problems in the econometric test of that class of models 6 .
In order to distinguish corruption among the causes of bureaucrats and public spending inefficiencies, the careful specification of an econometric model is needed. The specification of eq. (17) focuses on public investment, our proxy for infrastructure growth. This variable G refers to the share of the real public investment in the real GDP.
5 A review of the literature can be found in Acconcia and Del Monte, (1998 
Econometric results: Growth and corruption.
The first approaches to the econometric estimation of eq. (17) have led us to the choice of a maximum lag of one year, and to the adoption of ordinary least squares with dummy variables (LSDV). The basic equation is: 6 Jones, (Jones, 1995) highlights likely inconsistencies between the time series features of growth rates (often stationary) and those of its determinant variables (non-stationary). Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) maintain that introducing government policy variables in time series growth equations is the right way to testing endogenous growth theory. See also ch. 12 in Aghion and Howitt, 1998. 7 It is a matter of fact that everybody dealing with data concerning illegal activities does not know the true number of crimes. However, there is no evidence of differences across Italian regions in reporting crimes of corruption to the police, and these crimes usually do not involve strong violence that could justify fear. The Association of Young Entrepreneurs has produced a survey on corruption in Italy (see Giovani Imprenditori Confindustria, 1994) . Unfortunately, those interesting data are affected by self-selection and are not representative at a regional level, so they cannot be used in the kind of econometric analysis that we performed.
8 A more general specification GCor −η has been tested, with the estimate of η very close to one. In order to evaluate the influence of corruption on economic growth, the variable Cor has been added to the set of regressors. Cor has a significant negative parameter when lagged two periods. It could summarize several negative effects of corruption and efficiency of public institutions on economic growth. An appreciable effect of augmenting the basic equation (18) seems to be that on private investment (tab. 2). As well known in the literature, an important effect of corruption is lower private investment. This is also an important result in Mauro (1995) . The relation between investment and corruption is shown in table 3 that reports the estimates of an ADL model for I on the lagged values of itself, ∆y and Cor. Our results confirm the general opinion about the negative consequences of corruption on entrepreneurs' decisions.
Econometric results: Corruption and public investment.
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical explanation and econometric support to the hypothesis that corruption, among several negative effects on the economy, has an important adverse influence on the efficiency of the State organization. Testing for this distinct effect of corruption on economic growth requires the introduction of this variable in a non-linear fashion in regression equations. We have performed these enlarged regressions, and the ratio G/Cor has parameters estimates (table 2) According to our estimates, the same increase in public investment has a positive impact on the rate of growth of per capita GDP that varies inversely with the amount of corruption.
To figure out this effect of corruption among Italian regions, we compute the elasticity of the rate of growth ∆y to public investment G: It is also interesting to verify if our results concerning the negative effects of corruption on economic growth hold even if we control for other indicators of the quality of public institutions. In fact, recent studies (Putnam, 1993) 
Conclusions.
In this paper we dealt with the phenomenon of corruption that arises from purchases made by government officials. We maintain that this kind of corruption has a direct negative 
Eq. A2 can be rearranged as: Figure 1 . Public purchases monitoring P is determined equating expenditures to income from fines. 
